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Is the Future of Law a Driverless Car? Assessing
How the Data Analytics Revolution Will
Transform Legal Practice

Eric L. Talley1
November 2017
(First Draft: May 2017)

Abstract: Machine learning and artificial intelligence technologies (“data analytics”) are quickly
transforming research and practice in law, raising questions of whether the law can survive as a
vibrant profession for natural persons to enter. In this article, I argue that data analytics
approaches are overwhelmingly likely to continue to penetrate law, even in domains that have
heretofore been dominated by human decision makers. As a vehicle for demonstrating this claim,
I describe an extended example of using machine learning to identify and categorize fiduciary
duty waiver provisions in publicly disclosed corporate documents. Notwithstanding the power of
machine learning techniques, however, I remain doubtful that data analytics will categorically
displace lawyers from the practice of law, for two reasons. First, many of the most powerful
approaches in data analytics as applied to law are likely to continue to require human practitioner
inputs to train, calibrate and supervise machine classifiers. And second, the underlying
evolutionary process that characterizes legal doctrine and precedent is irreducibly dynamic and
complex – traits that are poorly adapted to pure algorithmic decision-making. Consequently,
aspiring legal researchers and practitioners should not fear entering the field, but in doing so they
would be well advised to invest in skill sets that are complementary to data analytics techniques.
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1. Introduction
The technologies of machine learning and artificial intelligence are quickly
colonizing vast swaths of academic research and professional practice across several
domains, and law is proving to be an accommodating target. Already a staple of the
discovery process and citation analysis, data analytics technologies are overcoming years
of motivated resistance to have significant penetration in transactional law as well. In
this article, I analyze some of the ways that this transition is unfolding, I explore some the
techniques that are appear to be particularly promising, and I speculate on what it
portends for the study and practice of law over the longer term.
As a metaphorical “vehicle” for this exercise, I analogize the data-analytics
revolution in law to the advent of the driverless care. As is now well understood, the
technology that enables driverless cars2 is developing rapidly, geared generally around
using data analytics (defined more rigorously below) to assess, predict and respond to
physical hazards and risks around an automobile.3 Within the next decade or so, it is
widely predicted that vehicles with such abilities will be commonplace on the streets and
highways of the US and the world.4 Its infusion into our everyday life will without a
doubt carry great convenience to many. But at the same time, the driverless car portends
significant dislocation to others, such as chauffeurs, truck drivers, bus drivers, taxi
drivers, and even the ascendant workforce of Uber and Lyft. Society’s widespread gains
will be their collective loss.

2

Sometimes called the “autonomous car,” the “robotic car” or the “self-driving car,” the driverless car has
been under development at Google and other companies for years. See, e.g.,
https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/.
3
See Id. at 8-13.
4
See, e.g., Leslie Hook and Tim Bradshaw, “Driverless cars inspire a new gold rush in California,”
Financial Times (May 24, 2017).
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Is the evolution of autonomous vehicles and their impacts—both positive and
negative—an appropriate metaphor for the evolution of legal practice and scholarship?
On first blush, the metaphor seems apt: much of what goes into effective lawyering
consists of assessing, predicting and responding to legal hazards and risks that will
plausibly befall one’s client. Over the course of centuries, law schools have developed
tools to train professionals to develop such skills as a concomitant of their professional
competence and judgment. And, legal researchers have developed tools to understand
and evaluate the ecosystem and production of legal actors. But can this last? Might the
very same core technologies that sit behind autonomous automobiles have a similar
displacing force in the legal profession? As these technologies continue to develop, are
there any corollary benefits to this shift, in the same way that consumers would benefit
from the plight of drivers? More specifically, the astounding advances in data analytics
(and in the related but distinct subfields of machine learning, natural language processing,
big data and deep learning) over the last two decades have virtually upended several
brick-and-mortar industries. Is data-driven automation destined to do the same for the
practice of law?
Legal scholarship and research are similarly at risk of being consumed by data
analytics—both as means and end. Although quantitative analysis of law (also called
empirical legal studies) is nothing new, textual analysis methods have become
significantly more powerful over the last half decade. Are seasoned law professors,
whose claim to authority emanates from their deep and rich knowledge of legal
institutions, similarly at risk of being pushed off-stage by algorithms that are likely to do
a more complete and coherent job or summarizing and classifying the law? More to the
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point, if the very practice of law is destined to be colonized by deterministic algorithms,
is there anything interesting left for researchers and scholars to study? And thus, the
central question taken up below concerns whether (and how) both the practice and study
of law might also be upended by data analytics methods, and what the implications as
well as the opportunities are for those who currently occupy those fields.
The conclusion I offer to this set of questions is less alarmist than the motivating
question might suggest. Although data analytics techniques will no doubt change (and
will in many ways overtake) many of the key functions that lawyers and legal researchers
now perform, I argue that the longer term effect is unlikely to eliminate the demand for
lawyers per se as much as it will change the nature of what they do (and do not) perform.
Savvy aspiring legal professions would thus be wise to steer their ships in the honing
skills that are complements to (rather than substitutes for) data analytics tools. More to
the point, I argue that one of the most unyielding (and indeed unique) aspects of law is its
irreducible complexity – a complexity that (in my view) will necessarily implicate
significant human input over the longer term.
Before proceeding, it is important to define more clearly what I mean by terms
such as “data analytics”, “big data”, and “machine learning.”5 By and large, these terms
are susceptible to considerable gimmickry, and they warrant somewhat greater precision
than they are usually accorded if one is to discuss their implications meaningfully. For
instance, what is the difference between “big data” and data? Is there a real difference?

5

Other very popular but equally abstruse terms that refer to more or less the same umbrella of data
practices and methods include “data science”, “artificial intelligence”, and “informatics.” See, e.g., Bernard
Marr, “What Is The Difference Between Artificial Intelligence And Machine Learning?”, Forbes
(December 6, 2016).
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Although the nuances of the following definitions vary depending on whom one
asks, I take data analytics to represent a broad umbrella term under which big data and
machine learning reside. Functionally, the term differentiates prior eras of empirical
inquiry to this one, where the amount of data available (and consequently, the area of
opportunity for data analysts) is not only growing but becoming increasingly rich and
more detailed, demanding more sophisticated approaches. Machine learning (ML) is an
artificial intelligence term referring to those algorithms and methods that allow
computers to learn without being explicitly programmed.6 ML methods are often
conceptualized through the paradigm of analogous conscious and unconscious human
learning processes. For the purposes of this paper, then, I perceive six traits of data
analysis, the combination of which is unique to data analysis but several of which are
familiar:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Using quantitative data to analyze problems (here legal ones);
Calibrating and validating that analysis within statistical models;
Using such models for prediction (as opposed to testing a deductive “theory”);
Expansive / imaginative view about the sources of data;
Marshaling emergent machine learning techniques for analysis; and
Utilizing enhanced computing power to perform the aforementioned tasks.

To be sure, several of these characteristics have long been familiar to both legal
practitioners and legal scholars. The first two, for example, have been around for
decades, and are a hallmark of the empirical legal scholarship movement. The third is
familiar as well; though in some respects, those schooled in quantitative social sciences
tend habitually to describe the enterprise of pure prediction enterprise with the pejorative
“data mining”—a term that used to reflect an instinctual disdain for those using empirical
methods to predict, but without understanding the causal drivers behind prediction. (Only
6

See, e.g., Andrew Ng, “Lecture 3 - What is Machine Learning?”, Coursera.
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recently has the pejorative connotation apparently flipped to a badge of honor.) The last
three factors, however, are relatively new, and are likely the key characteristics that
distinguish what is (arguably) new about modern data analytics, at least as I use the term
in this paper.

2.1: Data in the Practice of Law: eDiscovery
With these working definitions in mind, there is much in lawyering and legal
scholarship that lends itself to modern data analysis. Consider an area of legal practice
that has already been invaded by it: the e-Discovery industry, which has clearly
established the biggest beachhead for data analytics methods in the law. (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: Law Firm Leverage (Source: National Law Journal)

e-Discovery has driven the drastic change in leverage ratios inside litigation firms, i.e.,
the reduced need for associates within litigation-oriented firms. Early in my own career,
I had exposure to this process in a patent litigation firm. Associates played a key role in
processing discovery—with as many as a half dozen (or more) effectively acting as highpaid research assistants for each partner, combing through banker’s boxes of produced
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discovery materials. Flash forward to today, where, with the assistance of outsourced ediscovery services, this process can be executed with one. A partial result of this trend, as
depicted in Figure 1, is a recalibration of law firm “leverage” ratio of associates to
partners in litigation-oriented law firms, which notoriously crossed below the focal 1:1
benchmark in 2010.
At the same time, the business model of data analytics service provers to lawyers
has proven fertile. Already a $6-$7 billion industry, by 2019 the global size of the eDiscovery industry is projected to rise to almost $11 billion (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: e-Discovery Market Size (Source: ComplexDiscovery.com)

Two-thirds of that growth, moreover, is projected to be from inside the U.S. Note one
other aspect of Figure 2: some of this anticipated growth will come from the sale of
software, an area where lawyers enjoy little comparative advantage. But much of it will
come through the provision of services—something that we are good at as lawyers. (I
shall return to this point below.)
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To many, it is already clear that e-Discovery is but the tip of the iceberg when it
comes to using data analytics techniques for lawyering. Indeed, on the front lines of the
data analytics revolution, companies and organizations are increasingly collecting and
leveraging their own quantitative data. When these entities are involved in litigation, it is
often necessary to evaluate these data as part of crafting and developing a legal argument.
It is also not difficult to find areas of law that are natural foci of legal scholarship and
which are susceptible to data analytics approaches. In the next section, I walk through an
extended example of one such area to demonstrate the logic of how data analytics can be
used in an area far outside the litigation environment: transactional law.

2.2: Data in Legal Scholarship: Identifying Corporate Opportunity Waivers
How does one harness data analytics technology in practice, and how might it
affect legal scholarship? There are many different algorithms and approaches one might
use; but for current purposes, it suffices to concentrate on a simple example. I
emphasize that this is but one example using one possible algorithm of many7, but one
whose general approach may be particularly useful both to lawyers and researchers
interested in empirical work.8
The example I develop below comes from jointly authored work with Gabriel
Rauterberg (Rauterberg & Talley 2017), using machine learning techniques to develop a
first-of-its-kind data set of “corporate opportunity waivers” (COWs) in public
disclosures. (Because space and audience considerations did not permit a detailed

7

For an expanded discussion on what algorithms are available using machine learning methods, refer to
Elliott Ash’s and Michael A. Livermore’s responses to this paper.
8
An early version of this approach was developed in Talley & O’Kane (2012).
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exposition of the techniques used in Rauterberg & Talley (2017), this paper also provides
a helpful methodological companion piece.)
Before getting to the specifics of the machine learning details, a little background
of the problem studied in Rauterberg & Talley (2017) is in order. A critical doctrinal and
conceptual anchor of business law is the concept of “fiduciary duties” owed by managers,
officers, directors and significant block equity holders to the business entity, the violation
of which is the touchstone for nearly every type of significant form of corporate liability
exposure. Fiduciary duties generally fall into one of two categories: the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty. Of these branches, most would agree that the most weighty is the duty
of loyalty – which governs actions involving financial conflicts of interest between the
fiduciary and the company – has long been said to be immutable (non-waivable) by the
parties. Indeed, most textbooks and treatises spend significant time covering the duty of
loyalty, often noting that the duty is so sacred that it is immutable—not susceptible to any
attempted end runs around it (contractual or not).
That traditional characterization, as it turns out, is not strictly accurate anymore:
Beginning in 2000, a handful of states (starting with Delaware) began to amend their
statutes to permit waivers of a specific manifestation of the duty of loyalty: the corporate
opportunities doctrine, which prohibits corporate fiduciaries from pursuing (in their
personal capacities) new business opportunities in the corporation’s line of business,
without first permitting the corporation a right of first refusal. While the doctrine is
traditionally not waivable (just like other forms of loyalty), the new statutory reforms
created an important carve-out that permitted business entities to promulgate “corporate
opportunity waivers” (“COWs”). The statutory reforms, however, were also notoriously
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inexact as to how a company should go about waiving corporate opportunities, giving
notoriously imprecise instructions as to where a COW was to be memorialized (e.g., in a
corporate charter, bylaw, resolution of the board, or some other contractual agreement).
Indeed, the enabling statutes in the nine states that have promulgated them give firms
substantial freedom to embed waivers in virtually any of these ways.9
This lack of statutory precision makes empirical analysis of waivers (and thus
their effects) challenging to study using traditional empirical methods. Indeed, prior to
Rauterberg & Talley (2017), there had been no systematic empirical analysis of COWs,
no doubt in part because of the difficulty of data collection. Under conventional
approaches to data collection, it was all but impossible to manually collect these data in a
cost-efficient manner, akin to looking for needles inside hay stacks embedded within
larger hay stacks.
The key to unlocking the data set came from a machine learning (ML) classifier.
Recall that machine learning was defined above as an approach allowing computers to
learn without being explicitly programmed. Where a traditional approach would require
using trained research assistants to comb through the entirety of a corpus, classifying
each public disclosure one at a time, a supervised ML approach instead endeavours to
train a machine learning algorithm to automatically classify documents. I describe the
approach below.
Because the ML approach may be unfamiliar to some readers, and in the light of
its great potential across other areas of law and finance research, this note explains the
basic components of the ML approach using a simple example, and demonstrates
strategies for calibrating and evaluating the classifier. (The description below also largely
9

For a theoretical model of optimal contracting over corporate opportunities, see Talley (1998).
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tracks the procedure developed originally by Talley & O’Kane 2012.) There are six
principal steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Text Extraction from Raw Data
Text Cleaning
N-Gram Parsing
TF-IDF Transformation
Dimensionality Reduction
Supervised Calibration, Out-of-Sample Extrapolation, and Evaluation

Text Extraction from Raw Data
The starting point of the analysis is a set of raw textual documents, assumed here
to be in ASCII format (but could be HTML, PDF, UTF-8, etc. Each comes with its own
challenges and prescriptions). This set of documents constitutes the set of raw
unstructured “inputs” the researcher is interested in (e.g., merger agreements,
constitutions, corporate charters, contracts, legal opinions, etc.) In Rauterberg & Talley
(2017), the raw documentary inputs were the full text of all public securities filings for all
companies between 1995 and March 2016. From these raw inputs, Rauterberg & Talley
extracted text “snippets” that were identified as candidate COWs. Candidate COWs were
flagged through a deliberately general and over-inclusive Boolean key-word search of
SEC/Edgar filings. Specifically, document snippets consisted of the flagged key words,
plus a 150-word margin of text proceeding and succeeding them in the document. Where
the key-word search flagged multiple sections of a single document, the resulting snippet
included the union of the collected individual snippets and 150-word margins. While the
Boolean key-word query deliberately flagged many “false positive” documents, it also
helped both to pare down both the number of documents requiring classification, and to
narrow the text to be analyzed within each document. (See Rauterberg & Talley 2017 for
details.)
11
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Text Cleaning
From the set of candidate snippets, Rauterberg & Talley (2017) undertook measures to
clean and parse the extracted data. These measures typically consist of several steps:


Typesetting Code: If the document was in a non-ASCII format, any typesetting
codes (e.g., HTML tags) are stripped out.10



Punctuation: All punctuation is stripped out from the text (such as periods,
commas, exclamation points, question marks, ellipses, colons, semi-colons, etc.).



Stems: Word inflections are also typically stripped to their word stem (or base
form). For example, the terms “walking”, “walked”, “walks”, and “walkable”
would all be reduced to “walk”, and treated identically thereafter. A stemming
library is necessary for this step (available in many Python modules).



Stop Words: Finally, although not implemented in Rauterberg & Talley (2017),
it is often thought desirable to drop “common” words that contribute little to the
semantic content of the document. For example, words like “the” or “an” or “are”
or “is” are frequently dropped in some applications. Stripping out stop words
similarly requires using a library utility.

Note that while these are considered typical data cleaning steps, it is conceivable, for
example, that a researcher trying to classify the sentiment of a document (another
common machine learning task) might find that it is useful for his purposes to include
punctuation in their data set. Different research problems require different approaches,
and researchers often try many combinations of data cleaning steps.

N-Gram Parsing
From the cleaned and parsed documents, the next step is to extract a numerical matrix
of N-grams tabulating raw numerical counts of each unique permutation of “N”
consecutive words across the entire set of relevant documents. For instance, the most
common n-gram representation is a matrix of “1-grams”, “unigrams” or “bag-of-words”,
constituting the raw frequency counts of single stemmed terms. Denote this matrix by
10

In the current project, strings are converted into bytes and back to strings to clean out non-ASCII
characters.
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N, where representative element nij represents “count frequency” -- the number of times
term j appears in document i. Matrix N is a foundational intermediate result.
To elucidate this step, consider a simple example inspired by a familiar literary
canon.11 Suppose one were interested in a set of five “documents” (labelled D1 through
D5, respectively), whose contents are as follows:






D1: Hickory, dickory, dock;
D2: The mouse ran up the clock;
D3: The clock struck one;
D4: The mouse ran down;
D5: Hickory, dickory, dock.

Parsing these documents into 1-grams yields the following matrix N:
hickory

dickory

dock

the

mouse

ran

up

clock

struck

one

down

D1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

D2

0

0

0

2

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

D3

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

D4

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

D5

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Table 1: Raw 1-gram Matrix N
The extraction of N-grams (in this case at the 1-gram level12) is a typical step in
summarizing the “latent” semantic content of a document. The rows of Table 1
effectively summarize the content of each document as a vector in 11-dimensional space,
11 being the number of distinct words in all five documents. It is possible using standard

11

See Goose, M. (c. 1697).
It is possible also to parse the documents at the 2-gram (or 3-gram level, etc.), so that the columns of
matrix N would consist of the universe of consecutive pairs (or triples, etc.) of terms. Surprisingly, in many
cases, a 1-gram parsing has significant explanatory power. Rauterberg & Talley (2017), for example,
extract 1-grams from their raw data set, and on that basis alone calibrate a machine-learning classifier with
an accuracy rate in the mid 90% range. See infra.
12

13

TALLEY, E.

IS THE FUTURE OF LAW A DRIVERLESS CAR?

NOVEMBER 2017

measures of distance to assess the similarity of any two of these vectors, and thus,
documents.
One common measure of similarity is a vector cosine measure, in which the
distance between two vectors 𝑋 and 𝑌 is given by the cosine of the angle formed between
𝑋∙𝑌

the two vectors, ‖𝑋‖‖𝑌‖, where ‖𝑋‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of 𝑋. The grid of
similarity scores in the running example from above is pictured in Table 2, bounded
between zero (no similarity) and one (identical content). 13

D1
D2
D3
D4
D5

D1
1
0
0
0
1

D2

D3

D4

D5

1
0.53033
0.707107
0

1
0.25
0

1
0

1

Table 2: Cosine Similarity of Documents D1 through D5

Many e-Discovery and plagiarism detection utilities make use of proximity scores
such as those in Table 2, assessing the similarity between documents in the corpus and
“flagged” specimens (such as hot discovery documents or known student essays
circulating on the internet). For example, if document D2 were tagged in litigation as
being incriminating, a search of the remaining documents in the corpus would likely flag
D4, and possibly also D3; but neither D1 nor D2 appear to bear any syntactical similarity.
Other more sophisticated approaches can refine the document summaries even
further to accentuate unique attributes of each document. For instance, note from Table 1
that the common article “the” appears several times. In many applications, a stop-word
13

Clearly, cosine is one of many alternative distance measures one might employ in practice. It has the
advantage, however, of being scale independent, and always falling between 0 and 1 (assuming nonnegative word counts)
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dictionary typically strips this type of term out, and the use of such a dictionary is subject
to the preferences of the researcher. (In some cases, including the example above,
removing stop words visits a loss on predictive power, and thus some researchers choose
to leave them in).
Having extracted matrix N, a common next step is to transform the raw frequency
counts into “term frequency – inverse document frequency” (or TF–IDF) measures. The
purpose and effect of this transformation is to accord greater proportional weight to the
counts of terms that appear frequently in a particular document and yet are relatively
uncommon overall. The resulting transformed matrix, T, contains representative element
tij for document i and term j, defined by the expression:

 nij
t ij  
 n
 m mj

1


 | { j : nij  0} | 
  ln 
 ,

M




(1)

where m  {1, …, M} indexes the universe of documents analyzed. The first bracketed
element of (1) represents the raw count of a given term in document i relative to its total
across all documents. The second term consists of the log of the inverse frequency with
which term j appears (at least once) across the universe (with cardinality M) of
documents analyzed. By “rewarding” the frequent intra-document use of terms that are
rare on the whole, the TF–IDF transformation tends to be better able to differentiate
unique documents (Salton and Buckley, 1988).
In the example from above, transforming the raw counts of matrix N into a TFIDF matrix T is a relatively straightforward computational task. Consider again the term
“the”, which appears twice in D2. This term appears a total of four times across all
documents. And thus, in D2, the relative frequency of “the” is given by:
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 nij  2

   0.5
 n  4
 m mj 

(2)

Additionally, the term “the” makes at least one appearance in 3 out of a total of 5
documents, and thus its document frequency is 3/5. The natural log of the inverse of the
document frequency is therefore:
 | { j : nij  0} | 
ln 

M



1

5
 ln    0.223,
3

(3)

and thus the TF-IDF value for the word “the” in D2 is:
1

t2, 4

 n

 | { j : n2, 4  0} | 
2
5
  2, 4   ln 
    ln    0.112.

 n 
5
4
 3


 m m, 4 

(4)

Applying the identical transformation to the other elements of the raw unigram
matrix is given in Table 2 below. Notice from the Table that D1 and D5 have identical
components, indicating that they are substantially similar (indeed identical) to one
another. In addition, D2 and D4 share many similar components, but are far from
identical. D3 is the most unlike the others.

hickory

dickory

dock

the

mouse

ran

up

clock

struck

one

down

D1

0.458

0.458

0.458

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

D2

0

0

0

0.112

0.458

0.458

1.609

0.458

0

0

0

D3

0

0

0

0.056

0

0

0

0.458

1.609

1.609

0

D4

0

0

0

0.056

0.458

0.458

0

0

0

0

1.609

D5

0.458

0.458

0.458

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Table 3: TF-IDF matrix T

Note that like the raw count matrix N, the TF–IDF transformed matrix T has a
fixed point at nij = 0, and thus any term that appeared with a frequency of zero in the raw
matrix would remain at zero after transformation. Consequently, in most “real world”
16
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applications T usually remains both extremely large (many columns) and sparse (many
cells with value 0). The next step, then, is to employ a technique known as Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD) that allows one to reduce the dimensionality of the data set
with minimal information loss.
The concept of SVD is a straightforward matrix operation. Consider our
transformed TF–IDF word count matrix T (with elements tij). Singular value
decomposition involves using the algebraic structure of T to produce synthetic variables
that are designed to explain internal variation within T. The key algebraic relationship for
accomplishing this task is given by the decomposition:
T = U    VT,

(5)

where U is a column orthonormal basis; V is a row orthonormal basis; and  is the
diagonal matrix of eigenvalues, where the component eigenvalues ii are ordered from
largest to smallest as one proceeds from down the diagonal, from upper left to lower
right.14
A machine learning classifier typically makes use of the first k components of U to
estimate the parameters of a predictive model (e.g., logit, probit), where k is chosen by
the researcher. See, e.g., Bishop (2006); Jolliffe (2002). These eigenvectors are
decreasing in strength, in that the first eigenvector explains the largest fraction of the
variability in the columns of matrix T, the second eigenvector explains the second
largest, and so on. Usually, the researcher will need to select a criterion for determining
the value of k. One common rule of thumb is to pick the number k that retains some
specified percentage  of the “energy” of the data, as measured by the sum of the squares

14

The SVD is done in Python using Scipy’s SVD function.
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of the principal eigenvalues in the diagonal matrix . That is, the value of k is the
smallest value for which:
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑘 =

∑𝑘𝑖=1(𝜎𝑖𝑖 )2
≥𝛾
∑𝑖(𝜎𝑖𝑖 )2

(6)

Leskovec et al. (2014). The subset of the columns of U selected becomes the variables of
interest for calibrating a predictive model.15
In the running example involving five simple documents, the singular value
decomposition of matrix T yields the following set of non-zero eigenvalues: {2.327,
1.883, 1.636, 1.122}. Note that there are only four non-zero singular values, even though
the example data set has five observations. This observation reflects the fact that the data
set is not of full rank, since D1 and D5 have identical content. The first two eigenvalues
manifest aggregate energy of approximately 63%, indicating that two factors can explain
roughly three fifths of the variation in the data. Adding a third factor would increase the
energy to 84%, and adding a fourth would increase it further to 100%. For illustrative
purposes, we limit our attention below to the first two eigenvalues, which have associated
eigenvectors denoted as F1 and F2. The numerical values of these factors as follows:

D1
D2
D3
D4
D5

F1
F2
0
0
0.10223301 0.77838211
0.99457099 -0.0921333
0.01941521 0.62099336
0
0
Table 4: 2-Factors

Although some information is clearly lost in reducing the dimensionality of the
parsed data set from 11 columns to 2, the retained factors still manage to capture a
15

Elliott Ash discusses additional dimension reduction techniques as well as benefits and potential
downsides of each in his response to this paper.
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significant amount of the variation in the documents. D1 and D5, for example, still share
identical coordinates, and D2 and D4 still appear similar (albeit not identical) in both
dimensions. D3 remains the most unlike the others. A scatter plot of the documents in
factor space helps illustrate this point, as pictured in Figure X.

Figure 3: D1-D5 as Depicted in 2-Dimensional Factor Space

Even reduced dimensionality space, the documents effectively cluster in three
areas, and are amenable to analysis as such.
Rauterberg & Talley (2017) apply a virtually identical approach to the
approximately 10,600 snippets of candidate corporate opportunity waivers flagged from
public SEC filings. The eigenvalues that emerge from that analysis are pictured in Figure
4, along with their cumulative energy.
As illustrated Figure 4, substantial variation in the textual corpus can be captured
with a relatively small number of factors. The number of factors used for model
calibration must be selected with some care. Select too few, and the classifier will be
insufficiently nuanced to be accurate. Select too many, and the researcher is sure to
overfit the model, making its extrapolation to out-of-sample data unreliable. Rauterberg
& Talley (2017) ultimately select the first 14 principal eigenvectors, corresponding to a
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90% energy threshold. Based on calibration tests (see below), this choice appears to work
extremely well in the corporate opportunity waiver context.

Figure 4: Principal Eigenvalues for Candidate COWs and Energy

Supervised Calibration, Out-of-Sample Extrapolation, and Evaluation
The processes described above – i.e., summarizing latent textual data as a matrix
and reducing its dimensionality – are common steps in a variety of distinct machine
learning applications to law. What happens from there turns on the nature of the project.
Broadly speaking, machine learning techniques applied to textual data tend to divide into
one of two approaches: unsupervised learning and supervised learning. Unsupervised
learning explores the structure of the data itself, with the goal of uncovering textual
patterns, similarities, sequential regularities, and syntactical “clusters” internal to the text
itself (i.e., without the researcher’s input). The process of identifying such patterns, or
“topics” associated with the data often (though not always) involves extracting principal
eigenvalues, as described above.16

16

Formally, a topic model estimates a probability distribution across words in a fixed vocabulary. See Blei
et al. (2003).
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While unsupervised learning techniques can be incredibly useful in uncovering
hard-to-detect patterns in textual data, evaluating the significance of such patterns is
sometimes challenging unless one has an independent means for assessing importance
and/or gravity of various types of document. This limitation is particularly salient in
legal applications of text analysis, which tend to turn on whether the language used in a
contract / regulation / judicial opinion imposes a net legal burden or benefit on
populations of interest, and the magnitudes of such effects. Consequently, it will often be
desirable – in addition to summarizing textual content of the corpus – to involve “real
world” human classifiers to assess the language and import of some subset of the textual
data being analysed, as one does in supervised learning techniques. In turn, this humancoded data can be used to “train” a predictive model to classify the universe of
documents, including those that human coders have never previously assessed.
Rauterberg & Talley (2017) pursue the latter course of supervised learning. From
a data set of 10,682 snippets that included candidate waivers, the authors and a team of
research assistants manually coded 1,000 randomly selected snippets along over 40
dichotomous dimensions, including not only the presence/absence of a waiver disclosure
(our primary topic of interest), but also the scope, reach, and location of such disclosures
when they occurred. The most significant variable, of course, is whether the candidate
disclosure was a bona fide disclosure of a waiver (in whatever form). They find
approximately 62% of the hand-classified sample fits this description. The hand-coding
of this sample, in turn, creates a “training” data set for a machine learning perceptron –
an algorithm for predicting the presence or absence of a genuine disclosure in a given
document.
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Stripped down to its essentials, calibrating a perceptron reduces to estimating a
qualitative regression such as:
Pr{𝑦𝑖 = 1} = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖 |𝛽),

(7)

where yi denotes the dependent dichotomous variable (here, the presence or absence of a
waiver disclosure), f is some (potentially non-linear) function of data attributes Xi and an
error term i, and  is a vector of estimated coefficients. In what follows, we employ
logistic regression, but a similar approach would apply to probit, linear probability, SVM
estimation, and others.
Once the elements of  are estimated, it is possible to assess how well the model
“fits” the patterns manifest within the sample data set. Unlike more conventional
regression analysis approaches, however, where the elements of Xi are easily interpreted
variables of interest, here these elements consist of the principal eigenvectors extracted
from the decomposition of the text data matrix. As such, their interpretational content is
recondite, and thus the interpretation of the estimated coefficients is of little interest.

ML Classifier

Hand Coded
Present
Absent
Total

Fit Measure (50% Classifier)

Present
595
30

Absent
35
340

Total
630
370

625

375

1000

Logit Estimation
Pseudo
R2
Log lik.
2(14)

0.7194
-185.65
951.83***

Sensitivity (True Positive Rate)
Specificity (True Negative Rate)
Positive predictive value

95.20%
90.67%
94.44%

Negative predictive value
False Positive Rate (1 - Specificity)
False Negative Rate (1 - Sensitivity)

91.89%
9.33%
4.80%

Converse False Positive
Converse False Negative

5.56%
8.11%

Correctly classified

93.50%

Table 5: Within-Sample Classification Accuracy of COW Disclosures
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What is usually of interest, however, is whether the model does a good job in
practice of classifying the textual data. Several diagnostics are helpful in measuring
predictive performance, such as the rate of false positive and false negative
classifications. Table 5 provides several metrics along these lines, employing a
classification “assignment rule” that assigns the value of 1 whenever the estimated model
probability of a COW is at least 50%. Using this assignment rule, we find a correct
classification rate of 93.5% across the entire sample, and reasonably good rates of both
false positive classifications (9.33%) and false negative classifications (4.8%). The
underlying prediction model – built on a logistic regression – delivered strong predictive
power at all conventional levels of statistical significance.
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Function

0.50
0.00

0.25

Sensitivity

0.75

1.00

Area Under Curve (Within Sample)

0.00

0.25

0.50
1 - Specificity

0.75

1.00

Area under ROC curve = 0.9764

Figure 5: ROC Mapping (Within-Sample)

Another approach for assessing classification accuracy makes use of the (socalled) “Receiver Operating Characteristic” (or ROC) function. This function represents
parametric curve that emerges as one varies the assignment rule from 0% to 100%,
plotting the false positive rate (horizontal axis) against the true positive rate (vertical
axis) along the way. Good classifiers will tend to “bow” towards the northwest corner of
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the unit square, a point that coincides with perfect classification. Consequently, the area
under the curve of the ROC (sometimes called the ROC-AUC) is a common proxy for
classifier performance: The closer the ROC-AUC area is to 1, the better the classifier.
Figure 5 illustrates the ROC function for our within-sample estimations. As can be seen
from the Figure, the quality of the machine classifier appears exceptionally good, with a
ROC-AUC measure of 0.9764.
Although in-sample calibrations (here, the hand-coded 1,000 documents) are
instructive, we expect that they will necessarily degrade somewhat when the predictive
model is taken outside of the training sample to the rest of the data set (i.e., the full set of
10,600 documents less the 1,000 hand-coded documents). Nevertheless, it is out-ofsample prediction where the ML approach can be useful in economizing the time and
expense of hand coding. We cannot check the accuracy of the model’s classification of
the 9,600 documents without hand-coding them as well, so we utilize Monte Carlo
simulations on the hand-coded 1,000 documents for which we can definitively check the
model’s classification accuracy against the hand-coded classifications. The Monte Carlo
simulation approach was employed in Talley & O’Kane (2012), and previously proposed
by Breiman (1996) and Friedman et al. (2000; 2003). Within each iteration of the
simulation, the sample data set of 1,000 hand-coded documents were randomly
segregated into two groups: A provisional “training” data set, consisting of roughly 75%
of our sample data set, and a provisional “testing” data set, consisting of the remaining
25% of the sample data set. We then fit equation (2) to the training data, marshalling the
resulting coefficient estimates to generate predictions of the presence/absence of the
waiver in the testing data, and generating predictive metrics similar to those discussed
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above. We repeated the Monte Carlo simulation for 1,000 iterations, which produced
empirical distributions for each of these metrics.
Table 6 presents classification performance metrics from the simulations. The
results are surprisingly good. Overall, while the percentage of correct classifications
declined (as expected), they fell by an extremely modest one percent (from 93.5% to
92.5%), a pattern generally replicated symmetrically in both positive and negative
classifications. Similarly, the area under the ROC curve declined, but again only
trivially—from 0.9764 in the full sample to a mean value of 0.9727 across the Monte
Carlo simulations. Moreover, the standard deviations associated with each of the Monte
Carlo metrics also appear notably modest – indicating precise estimation.

% Correctly Classified
Sensitivity (50% classifier)
Specificity (50% classifier)
Area under ROC

MC Iter.
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000

Mean
92.4980
94.3740
89.3847
0.9727

St. Dev.
1.5123
1.8423
3.1513
0.0086

Median
92.4000
94.4828
89.5294
0.9728

Min
86.8000
87.3418
78.4946
0.9363

Max
96.8000
98.6928
98.9362
0.9945

Table 6: Monte Carlo Classification Metrics, Simulated Out-of-Sample Data

The respectable correct classification rates might can also be put into perspective
by comparing it to the rate of human error. Interestingly, it is possible to deploy the ML
classifier to back-test and audit the accuracy of the human coders whose classifications
were used to train the very algorithm testing them. A hand-audit of “disagreements”
between the ML classifier and human classifications in the original sample, human
classifiers were found to be accurate approximately 97.8% of the time. Thus, the
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difference between human and machine classification is even smaller than reflected in
Table 5.17
A final diagnostic measure of how well the ML classifier performs is to
extrapolate the calibrated within-sample model onto the full data set, thereby generating
estimated probabilities of the presence/absence of a waiver disclosure over the entire
universe of snippets. The frequency distribution of estimated probabilities can provide
some sense of how definitively the ML classifier discriminates between positives and
negatives.
Histogram of Predicted Probabilities of COW Disclosure

10
0

5

Density

15

20

Machine Coded Classifier

0

.2

.4
.6
Pr{COW Present}

.8

1

Figure 6

Figure 6 illustrates the histogram of estimated waiver probabilities extrapolated over the
full data set (N=10,620). The figure does not correct any of the known misclassifications
in the hand-coded set, and thus it accurately illustrates the noise that the ML classifier
introduces. Note the strongly bimodal distribution in the empirical frequency, indicating
that the ML classifier not only discriminates between likely waivers and non-waivers, but

17

This auditing process also permitted correction and re-estimation of the ML classifier using corrected
hand-coded data. Tables 4 and 5 reflect this corrected model.
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does so with some degree of statistical definitiveness.18 Thus we are confident that the
model trained by the 1,000 observation sample data set can be satisfactorily applied to
classify the rest of the out-of-sample data set. I pause here to point out the magnitude of
labour saved – whereas the absence of ML methods would have demanded an army of
research assistants hand-coding 10,600 documents, ML methods allow for automated
classification of 90% of the entire data set that is as accurate as hand-coding.

3. Implications for Legal Researchers and Practitioners
The above example is admittedly particularized, but many parts of the basic
approach generalize broadly to legal practice and research. As noted above, there have
now been for many years several applications of data analytics in the field of law,
particularly in litigation domains. Machine learning oriented citation of an opinion
analysis has been around for over a decade, and can be extremely valuable to discern
patterns and clusters of precedent citations as well as parallel lines of precedent (Katz and
Stafford 2010). In addition, legal document comparison is a well-established machine
learning approach, with e-Discovery serving as a prime example. Indeed, as noted above,
the efficiency of data analytic approaches in discovery helps explain the de-leveraging
trends in law firms illustrated in Figure 1. Rather than having a large team of associates
looking for inculpating documents in produced records, it has now become commonplace

18

Fortunately, the Monte Carlo simulations yielded a ML classifier that performed extremely well by
conventional measures. We thus deemed it unnecessary to iterate our calibrations further. That said, in
many applications, the researcher must often continue to iterate on the calibration, for example by selecting
a different preceptor model, adjusting the number of retained factors to optimize the out-of-sample
performance, extracting 2-grams or 3-grams rather than 1-grams, or even going back to the original data set
to code additional training documents by hand.
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to staff just one or two associates on such a task, attempting to find a smaller number of
“hot” documents that can serve as a comparison template for algorithmic search.
Increasingly, transactional attorneys (and researchers) are coming to utilize
machine learning tools to great effect. For example, mergers and acquisitions
practitioners are obsessed with “what is market?” – a shorthand for understanding the
trends in terms that other parties tend to include in definitive merger agreements. Talley
& O’Kane (2012) utilized a methodology similar to that which is described above to
classify “material adverse effect” (or Act of God) clauses in M&A agreements. (I and a
group of research assistants are currently working with the American Bar Association to
produce an automated version of their annual “Dealpoints” study that hand-codes merger
provisions in large deals on an annual basis.)
The far more tempting (though still largely undeveloped) frontier is to use data
analytics and machine learning to predict judicial outcomes in ongoing cases. By
conceptualizing the set of complaints, briefs, expert reports, existing case law (and so
forth) as the corpus, can one predict a plaintiff’s chances of prevailing should a case go to
trial? More generally, could insurers, lenders and other contractual entities predict ex ante
litigation risk exposure from specific practices (e.g., marketing a new pharmaceutical or
consumer product)? Can one predict regulatory or political risk associated with merger
activity or pricing? Each of these approaches seem readily amenable to data analytics and
machine learning methodologies.
Somewhat tellingly, however, the above tasks are also predominantly those
carried out by most lawyers and legal researchers. If an algorithm can exercise legal
judgment, make predictions, and assess risks more efficiently (and possibly more
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accurately) than a human, we come full circle to the question posted by the title of this
essay: Are lawyers and legal researchers soon to be displaced by data analytics methods
in both the practice and research of law?
To get some traction on this question, it may help to advert to an academic
discussion more familiar within law and philosophy about whether legal argumentation
and rhetoric is something akin to a complex game (such as chess), with attorneys playing
the role of players and judges the role of judge. H.L.A. Hart, Stanley Fish, Andrei
Marmor, and several others have developed this topic at some length. And if it is correct
that law and chess are roughly analogous, then we indeed have something to worry about.
Consider:




IBM’s Deep Blue, knocking off chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov,
Google’s AlphaGO defeating the top five “Go” players in the world, or
IBM’s Watson pulverizing several former champions in “Jeopardy.”

If the practice and study of law analogize to these types of complex games of skill, things
indeed appear bleak for most all legal professionals. This concern has no doubt given
rise to some degree of angst among people in the legal profession. The number of LSAT
takers and applicants to law schools have fallen along with the ratio of associates to
partners. Law schools are closing. Large firms are still laying off attorneys, well after the
financial crisis.
Is this an existential moment for law? Are we approaching the “singularity event”
that is so often talked about by technologists, where machine knowledge overtakes
human knowledge, never to return? Are we about to turn into the out-of-work drivers for
what will become the law’s driverless car?
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Perhaps; but I am skeptical for a variety of reasons. And it is not because I believe
data analytics and ML methods to be unpromising. As noted above, they are proving to
be extremely powerful (and promising). And yet, at least three considerations suggest that
the apocalyptic story (at least in its most extreme forms) will not come to pass.
First, the most powerful and promising sorts of data analytic methods – those that
hinge on supervised learning approaches – necessarily implicate human judgment as an
input in ways that more technocratic tasks (such as engineering a bridge) may not. The
corporate opportunities project detailed above, for example, required human classifiers to
train the algorithm, those classifiers, in turn, had to draw on their own legal training to
identify and understand the implications of what is (and is not) in the text of a contract,
email, warranty, disclosure, etc. Practicing lawyers must identify “hot” documents in
order to train an e-Discovery algorithm to have any predictive power. In nearly every
sub-field of law, moreover, the same legal terms can have entirely different connotations.
Thus, even if viewed as a perfectly consistent and unchanging institution (more on this
below), the practice and study of law is sufficiently complex that it would take decades to
distill into a set of reliable algorithms. Throughout this process, human knowledge and
machine learning would necessarily serve as complements – not substitutes – for one
another in relevant legal domains. Humans plus machines, at least in the context of law,
are going to be able to do far more than either of them independently.
Second, the law simply is not a static system, and it never has been. There are
some elements of how legal reasoning evolves that are unavoidably and irreducibly
complex. Consider, for example, the cases that we spend our time developing in first-year
law school classes: Marbury v. Madison, Buick v. MacPherson, Brown v. Board, Walker
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Thomas Furniture, Citizens United, Obergefell. These seminal cases are interesting for at
least two reasons: First, they were hard, legitimate “close calls” going in; but second,
they quite literally changed the course of law: Each marked an important conceptual
“shock” in the application of time-honed legal principals to factional situations. Each of
these watershed moments changed the way we conceive the law not just in a positive /
descriptive way, but also in normative / prescriptive dimensions. Such evolutionary
moments are difficult for algorithmic approaches to predict.
The free parameter played by the normative commitments underlying law
arguably motivated another well-known legal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, in his
consideration of the analogy of law to chess. He famously to rejected the analogy as
follows:
“In adjudication, unlike chess, the argument for a particular rule may
be more important than the argument from that rule to the particular
case; and while the chess referee who decides a case by appeal to a rule
no one has ever heard of before is likely to be dismissed or certified, the
judge who does so is likely to be celebrated in law school lectures.19
Dworkin’s observation nests closely to the idea that law, particularly common law
systems, gain much of their vitality because they are constantly in flux, influenced by a
persistent background normative dialogue (even if one that plays out through seemly
technocratic doctrinal distinctions). The forces of such a dialogue can (and do) affect the
application of law to facts, and can do so in ways that may cause legal outcomes to
exhibit (to the unschooled algorithmic eye) a “careening” characteristic, seemingly
manifesting stark and dramatic shifts from past practices and norms. Whenever the
“black letter law” seems settled, it can still be destabilized by public policy, theory,
normative commitments, and value trade-offs. These commitments—and how they
19

Dworkin (1978), at 112.
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evolve over time—are perhaps the most unpredictable of all forces that shape law and
legal institutions, and among the least amenable to algorithmic prediction.
A final reason that law as an institution is likely to be particularly resistant to
algorithmic takeovers is that law must continue to play a central role in mediating other
areas where we are really worried about technological singularity events. Such domains
include information privacy, intellectual property, securities market trading, and many
other areas are now trying to cope with the fact that in fact this may be a real danger in
other venues. Almost by definition, law must play a central role in determining the
appropriate role (and legal bounds) on automation. It is difficult to imagine that such a
regulatory role itself could be easily co-opted by an algorithm, charged with creating
regulations to stem bad consequences of algorithmic approaches elsewhere.

4. Conclusion
Data analytics will continue to affect and shape law for decades (if not centuries)
to come. As it does so, however, I would wager that lawyers and data analytics are not
likely to appear to be substitutes for one another as they will prove to be complements.
To the extent this prediction is true, then it is probably good news for human aspiring
lawyers who wish to embrace it (and eventually we must all embrace it). New lawyers
entering the field would be well advised to spend some time brushing up on data
analytics, coding, and statistics skills—and many of the brightest students, up-andcoming practitioners, and promising researchers have similarly begun to stake this area
out as prime real estate. It is these individuals—and not their data algorithms per se—
who will represent the greatest risks to established, traditional interests. Put differently,
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the biggest existential threat (and opportunity) posed by the data analytics revolution to
law is almost certainly ourselves, by being unaware of how quickly these applications are
growing, how they are likely to transform both practice and research far into the future,
and how quickly they will come to dominate the landscape. If law is to become a
driverless car in some capacity, lawyers and legal researchers cannot and should not be
left standing on the sidewalk.
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